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LIBEL AND SLANDER ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY UNDER STATUTE The
Board of Regents of the Colored Agricultural and Normal University of Oklahoma, charged with the statutory duty of governing the university "in all its
interests," directed the defendant, president of the university, to report to the
board "any misconduct" or "any irregularity" on the part of any "teacher or
employee of the University." At a regular session of the board the defendant
made an oral statement to the board, imputing moral misconduct to the plaintiff,
who was then employed as a matron at said university. Held, in making said
statement the defendant was acting "in the proper discharge of an official duty"
within the meaning of the statute defining privileged communications; and that
the occasion upon which the report. was made was absolutely privileged. Sanford
v. Howard, 185 Okla. 660, 95 P. (2d) 644 (1939).

RECENT DECISIONS
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The general rule has restricted absolute privilege to legislative proceedings,
judicial proceedings, and communications by military and naval officers.1
There is a tendency, however, to extend the doctrine of absolute privilege to
communications made by public officials in discharge of official duty. 2 In Spalding
v. Vilas,8 where absolute privilege is given to an official communication made by
the postmaster-general, the doctrine was extended to official communications
made by the heads of the executive departments of the federal government.
Later federal cases have extended the rule to communications made by inferior
federal executive officers to superiors in the course of official duty; 4 but the
doctrine has been rejected where the communication was made by the members
of a school board of the District of Columbia rather than by an official of an
executive department. 5 Thus, the federal courts are apparently inclined to limit
the extension of absolute privilege to officials of the executive departments.
Although the state courts are not uniform in extending absolute privilege to
communications made by public officials in discharge of official duty, the general
tendency shows a reluctance on the part of the courts to extend the doctrine to
such communications of public officials in the absence of statutory authority. 6
In such cases, the courts, while refusing to allow absolute privilege, hold the
communications to be at least qualifiedly privileged in accordance with the universally accepted rule of law on such facts.7 Where the public official has quasilegislative or quasi-judicial duties, some courts extend absolute privilege to his
communications made in discharge of such duties on the theory that they are
a part of legislative or judicial proceedings. 8 However, there are exceptions to
these general holdings of the state courts.9 The Illinois appellate court, in
extending absolute immunity to official communications made by the head of a
department under the board of education of the city of Chicago, holds that
"all communications either verbal or written passing between public officials
pertaining to their duties, and in conduct of the public business, are of necessity
absolutely privileged." 10 The decision of the instant case extends to communications made by public officers in discharge of official duty absolute immunity,
NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4th ed., 388 (1924).
26 M1cH. L. REv. 451 (1928).
3 161 U.S. 483, 16 S. Ct. 631 (1896).
¼ De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D. C. 167, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 163 (1904);
Miles v. McGrath, (D. C. Md. 1933) 4 F. Supp 603; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D.
C. 413 (1912).
5 Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 33 S. Ct. 1043 (1913).
6 Raymond v. Crall, 233 Mich. 268, 206 N. W. 556 (1925), noted 24 M1cH.
L. REV. 737 (1926); Stevenson v. Ward, 48 App. Div. 291, 62 N. Y. S. 717 (1900);
Greenwood v. Cobbey, 26 Neb. 449, 42 N. W. 413 (1889); Maurice v. Worden,
54 Md. 233 (1880).
1 NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL, 4th ed., 415 (1924).
8 Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 93 (1865); McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky.
802, 284 S. W. 88 (1926); Trebilcock v. Anderson, ll7 Mich. 39, 75 N. W. 129
(1898); Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyler (Vt.) 129 (1802).
9 Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho 609, 123 P. 478 (1912); Donner v. Francis, 255
111. App. 409 (1930). ·
10 Haskell v. Perkins, 165 111. App. 144 at 150 (19u).
1
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immunity greater than that granted to them under the common law of most
of the states.11 How far should the court go in extending absolute privilege to
public officials by the interpretation of the phrase "official duty"? If these words
are interpreted to include communications made in the exercise of duties by all
local and state officials, then such an extension is fraught with danger.12 It is
questionable whether in the principal case there is such a great public interest
involved as to warrant an extension of absolute privilege to official communications made by a president of a state university; the law in any case affords him
the protection of qualified privilege.
·

11 California has a similar statute, Cal. Civ. Code, (Deering, 1937), § 47,
enacted in 1872. 28 M1cH. L. REv. 347 (1930) contains a note on Layne v. Kirby,
(Cal. App. 1929) 278 P. 1046, a case decided under the California statute, which
shows how far the statute extends the privilege to "official proceedings." The case was
later reversed, 208 Cal. 694, 284 P. 441 ·(1930).
12 The basis of the absolute privilege doctrine rests on public policy. It is in the
public interest and welfare that persons be allowed to express their sentiments and
speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon certain occasions. As against that public
interest, the courts must weigh the injury to the individual caused by the defamation.
There must be great public necessity before the individual is required to surrender his
personal rights and to suffer loss for the benefit of the common welfare. Where the
duties of office are heavy, absolute privilege should be extended to officers to enable
them to carry out their duties without fear of civil suits. But no such great public
interest is involved in case of a local or inferior state officer. NEwELL, SLANDER AND
LIBEL, 4th ed., 387 (1924).

